Strengthening Australia's relationships with countries in the Pacific region

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade

World Citizens Association (Australia)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, has asked the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee to inquire into strengthening Australia's relationships with countries in the Pacific region.

Regarding the terms of reference for the inquiry, this submission will address in general terms:

1. The implementation of Australia's Pacific Step-up as a whole-of-government effort to deepen and coordinate Australia's Pacific initiatives; and

3. Measures to ensure Step-up initiatives reflect the priority needs of the governments and people of Pacific island countries.

Abstract

The Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, has recently announced a 'step up' in Australia's relations with our neighbours in the Pacific Islands Forum, to counter increasing Chinese influence in the region. We review the case for deepening integration in the Pacific to form a Pacific Islands Community, as the next step beyond the Pacific Islands Forum. New institutions of governance should include a Council of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly, and a Pacific Court.

Introduction

In recent times there has been widespread concern in Australia over the increase of Chinese influence in the Pacific region, brought to a head by the possibility that China might even try to set up a military base in Vanuatu. The Chinese government has been suspected of using 'debt-trap' diplomacy, offering large loans to countries in the region under their 'Belt and Road' initiative, which the recipients may have trouble repaying, thus being forced to offer concessions or facilities to the Chinese in return for forgiveness of the loans.

There is a perceived need for Australia and New Zealand to counter this influence by forging closer relations with our neighbouring Pacific island states in the Pacific Island Forum. The Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, has announced a 'step up' in our relations with the Forum, and paid several recent

visits to other members of our Pacific 'family'. This year will see our largest ever development assistance to the region of $1.4 billion, despite the decline in our overall aid budget. We will also be spending $500 million to ameliorate the effects of climate change in the region [Hawke 2019].

In these circumstances, the time seems ripe to revisit ideas for closer integration in the region, and more specifically, proposals for developing the Pacific Islands Forum into a *Pacific Islands Community*. Objectives of the Community would include:

- Improved collective security for the Pacific region, to counter any perceived security threat from China or other external powers;
- Greater cooperation in commercial enterprises, such as protection of the fishing industries of the Pacific island states;
- Greater cooperation in the distribution of aid and development funds to the island states;
- Advancement of human rights within the community;
- Closer participation by the island states in the formulation of regional policy in general.

Background

Integration in the Pacific has been proceeding by fits and starts ever since the former British colonies in the region attained their independence. It is obvious that the smaller island states cannot provide all the facilities of modern living for themselves, but must rely on co-operation with their neighbours if they are to have any hope of moving beyond a subsistence lifestyle. The current COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, has emphasized their reliance on their larger neighbours for assistance in case of a health emergency such as this. The South Pacific Forum was established in 1971 to foster co-operation between them, as an alternative to the old South Pacific Commission of colonial days, and in 1999 its name was changed to the Pacific Islands Forum to reflect a wider geographic reach.

The heads of government of the Pacific Islands Forum currently hold an annual meeting to discuss matters of common interest in the region. There are eighteen members, consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Palau, and Niue, plus recent new members New Caledonia and French Polynesia. There is enormous variation in size and resources between them, ranging from Australia with 24 million inhabitants to tiny Niue with 1600.

The main focus of the Forum hitherto has been on trade and economic issues, such as regional air and shipping services, and the fisheries in the surrounding seas. The day-to-day activities are carried out by the Forum Secretariat [PIF Secretariat] based in Suva, Fiji, with around 100 staff members. The Secretary-

General currently is Dame Meg Taylor from Papua New Guinea. The current annual budget is around A$30 million, of which Australia and New Zealand contribute about 60%. The main aims of the Secretariat are to provide economic and policy advice to the members of the Forum.

A number of crises have occurred in the region over recent years, including uprisings on Bougainville, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. The Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in Honiara in 2003 to help restore order there, with the consent of both the Solomon Islands parliament and the Pacific Islands Forum. It included personnel from many of the island states, giving RAMSI a truly Pacific face as representing the Forum as a whole.

Forum leaders have always endorsed ideas for greater cooperation and integration in the Pacific. A wide-ranging "Pacific Plan" for the future development of the Pacific region was drafted a decade ago [Pacific Plan 2007], but implementation of the Plan was stymied by the 2006 military coup and interregnum in Fiji (the headquarters of the Pacific Islands Forum), led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Fiji was suspended from membership in the Forum in 2009, and this suspension was not lifted until after a measure of democracy was restored, and a Fijian general election was held in September 2014.

In 2013 a Review of the Pacific Plan was commissioned, led by Sir Mekere Morauta, former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea. The Review expressed disappointment with the pace of regional integration under the Plan. Its central conclusion was that "what is needed to progress regionalism is not a revised list of priorities, but an overhaul of the processes, institutions, and governance of the Plan" [Pacific Plan Review 2013]. In particular, the Review suggested that the Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC), which is charged with oversight of the implementation of the Plan and is mainly staffed by bureaucrats, had largely failed to drive progress in regional integration. It should be replaced by a smaller Board for Pacific Regionalism including representatives of civil society and the private sector.

In 2014 the Pacific leaders replaced the Plan by a *'Framework for Pacific Regionalism'*, setting up a process by which proposals for regional integration could be reviewed and implemented. At the same time, a measure of democracy has been restored in Fiji, and elections have been held for a new Fijian Parliament, so the time has clearly come to reconsider further steps in regional integration. Scott Morrison has paid two recent visits to Fiji, and formed a good relationship with the Fijian leader, Frank Bainimarama.

The challenges facing the Pacific region were discussed in the *State of Pacific Regionalism Report 2017*. The report emphasized a growing sense of uncertainty due to shifting global and regional geopolitics. Some of the specific challenges mentioned include climate change, ocean management and conservation, and

regional conflict. All of these challenges demand a collective regional response, and they cannot be addressed by one nation acting alone. The Framework for Pacific Regionalism declared as one of its principal objectives "Strengthened governance, legal, financial, and administrative systems" in the region. The more recent *Blue Pacific communique* committed Forum Leaders to "strengthen regional architecture" [Blue Pacific 2017]
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The most recent *State of Pacific Regionalism Report 2019* from the Forum Secretariat offers an ambitious *Vision for a Blue Pacific Continent* in 2050. The Secretary General, Meg Taylor, in her foreword quotes the 2014 Framework document:

> *"Our Pacific Vision is for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives."*

She goes on to say that "the fundamental proposition underpinning the report is that 'deepening regionalism' requires the implementation of a long-term roadmap towards a Blue Pacific continent. That is, Pacific regionalism will be best advanced through the realization of the Blue Pacific Continent."

This paper discusses a possible first step in such a process, namely the upgrade of the Forum into a Pacific Islands Community.

Suggestions for Change

a) Governance

The 2013 Review advocated a "new framework for Pacific regionalism", and imagined a possible future path for the region leading all the way to a Pacific Union in imitation of the European Union, or even a Pacific Federation. These developments will only occur decades into the future, if they occur at all. But the immediate next step is very obvious, namely the formation of a *Pacific Islands Community*, as an extension of the present Forum.

The basic elements of a Pacific Islands Community are easily foreseen, and several are already in place:

- The Pacific Islands Forum already plays the role of a supreme Council. It would meet periodically to discuss major policy decisions, which would require a consensus for approval by the member states;
- A *Council of Ministers* should be formally instituted, consisting of the ministers from each member state in a particular area (e.g. fisheries), to meet as needed to discuss detailed policy in that area. A mechanism of "qualified majority voting" should be used in reaching decisions by the Council of Ministers, if necessary. This would avoid dominance of the Council by any

particular member state, or group of states, and also avoid possible deadlocks due to a veto by a single member. A possible scheme of this sort is discussed in the Appendix;

- The PIF Secretariat already fills the role of executive to the foreshadowed community;
- The Pacific Plan already proposed a *Forum Parliamentary Assembly* as an enlargement of the present Forum Presiding Officers Conference (FPOC) to meet once a year. This would provide some sort of democratic voice within the Community, and could indeed provide the nucleus of an eventual Pacific Parliament in the longer term;
- The Pacific Plan already proposed setting up a panel of judges to adjudge cases involving regional treaties, which could become the nucleus of an eventual Pacific legal system.

These changes should not involve any great additional expense, although they would involve some reallocation of funding and personnel to the new Community. Some further comments follow.

The Forum Economic Ministers already meet regularly, as do the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers. To facilitate decisions at such a Council of Ministers, and avoid any deadlock at this level due to a veto by one member state, a sensible voting scheme should be available if necessary at these meetings, as instituted by the Europeans. The scheme should naturally give greatest weight to the vote of the larger states, but it should also ensure that the smaller states have some 'voting power' over the decisions of the Council, and that no one state (Australia) or group of states dominates. The theoretical ideal scheme is discussed briefly in the Appendix, along with an alternative which gives greater weight to the smaller island states. This would allay the suspicions of the smaller states that a regional community would be dominated by Australia and New Zealand.

If a Forum Parliamentary Assembly is instituted, it would be natural to hold it at the same time as the leaders Forum, and in fact the two groups should probably hold a joint meeting during that time. In that way the Assembly members could be informed about the Forum decisions, and at the same time they could provide political input and advice to their leaders. At present, the Forum Presiding Officers Conference consists of the presiding officers of each member parliament. One model for the Assembly might also include an assembly of representatives from each major political party in each of the member states, to provide a range of views to the leaders. This would provide a natural basis for an eventual democratically elected Parliament. A discussion of the longer-term aim of a Pacific Parliament was given more than thirty years ago by Mike Moore, a former Prime Minister of New Zealand [Moore 1982].

A Pacific Court could be set up to hear cases involving Treaties between the member states on the basis of international law, and might eventually form the nucleus of a Pacific legal system. Given that the cases brought before the Court would very probably be few and far between, a reserve panel of judges could be

appointed at fairly minimal cost. As one example of a possible responsibility, the Court might be given the task of assessing penalties for illegal fishing by foreign vessels encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zones of the PIF member states. In the future, one can envisage the new legal system as helping to promote basic human rights within the community, such as gender equality, which has been a recent priority within DFAT.

A number of suggestions along these lines have already appeared. The Eminent Persons' Group [Eminent Persons Group 2004] called for consideration of "options for future economic and political integration", and said that "new thinking on the relationship between sovereign states may be required". They also suggested that a regional panel of judges be established. Prime Minister Tuilaepa Aiono Sailela Malielegaoi of Samoa, who was the chairman of the Forum at the time, gave an address in which he foreshadowed "a new phase of regional integration – a Pacific union of as yet unknown dimensions", and mentioned the EU as an example of what can be done [Malielegaoi 2005]. He suggested the formation of a regional pool of jurists and public prosecutors; "and perhaps the establishment of a regional constitutional court to deal with critical legal issues arising from major extra-constitutional crises in or between Forum countries". In the area of legislative governance, he proposed that the annual meetings of the Forum Presiding Officers Conference (FPOC) evolve into a platform for a regional Parliamentary Assembly, to promote the principles of legislative democracy, representative government and good governance. He also noted that member countries will need to "agree to give up a little bit of our sovereignty not only for the common good but for our needs as a government and as a nation". In this way, many aspects of an eventual community have already been anticipated. In a special report to the Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI), a distinguished task force concluded that "the best way forward in Australia's engagement with its Pacific neighbours lies in a regional integration of Australia and the Pacific Island states conceived in the widest possible sense" [ASPI 2008].

Several of these proposals were incorporated into the Pacific Plan [Pacific Plan 2007]. In the medium term, identified aims were to develop appropriate models for land ownership and tenure; and to *"enlarge the annual Forum Presiding Officers' Conference (FPOC) into a Forum Parliamentary Assembly to deepen regional co-operation between Pacific legislatures"*.

In the longer term, the Plan looked for "harmonization of court structures in the region, and *development of a regional judicial mechanism or process to deal with important legal issues arising out of major extra-constitutional crises in or between Forum countries"*. It included provisions for a register of judges and public prosecutors willing to serve in different countries. It did not yet explicitly recognize, however, that the Forum will itself need the power to make laws and regulations on common regional matters. If Pacific-wide economic integration is to be implemented, for instance, then the regional body will need to be given

power to regulate inter-island economic affairs. This begins to impinge on national sovereignty, as recognized by the Samoan Prime Minister, and will need ratification by further treaties between the member states.

In the more recent Blue Pacific communique (2017), Forum Leaders renewed their commitment to a strengthened regional architecture.

b) Trade and Development

We do not have very specific suggestions to offer in this area, which has been under active consideration by the Forum and its members over the years, except to say that the funding and personnel in these areas should be brought under the control of the new Community itself as far as possible. This would be a most important element, once again, in strengthening the sense of common citizenship, joint partnership and ownership of major community institutions between the Community members, which in turn would be a major counter to any malign foreign influences in the region. This would presumably require a rebranding and reallocation of funding and personnel of large elements of the Office of the Pacific from within the present Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to become a separate Australian arm of the new Pacific Islands Community.

Besides channeling Australian and New Zealand development funds under the control of the new Community, other foreign countries, such as France, the United States and China should be invited to do the same where possible, in order to demonstrate their disinterested goodwill towards the island states, and avoid any appearance of using the funds to exert any undue influence.

A difficult problem within this area concerns the present Pacific Islands Development Forum, set up in 2013 primarily at the instance of Fiji, during its period of suspension from the Forum (Tarte 2015). This Forum is separate from the PIF, and does not include Australia,New Zealand or New Gunea as members, with Fiji arguing that they exerted undue dominance over PIF decisions. Perhaps now that Fiji is reconciled to the PIF and has better relations with the Australian government, and given the promise of a greater voice for the island states under the new arrangements, this Forum could be brought back within the fold of the new Community. That would certainly be the neatest solution.

c) Security & defence

In our opinion, there is an obvious need for some upgraded mechanisms of regional common security, namely:
- A *Pacific Islands Maritime Patrol* to combat illegal fishing, piracy, drug smuggling and similar problems in the region. Such a force would

probably need to involve both seaborne and airborne elements, and to make use of resources such as satellite data, and the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar installation in Australia.

- A land-based security force, perhaps a *Pacific Islands Regiment*, to carry out peacekeeping duties both within and outside the region, and if necessary to intervene in "extra-constitutional crises" in the region. Interventions by such a force would carry much greater legitimacy than a similar intervention by (say) Australian or New Zealand forces, which are always subject to charges of paternalism or neo-colonialism. It could also provide a significant source of employment for some of the smaller islands.

The principle should be that the Pacific islands take collective responsibility for maintaining peace and security in their own region. Their responsibilities would include

- Monitoring and patrolling the exclusive economic zones of the PIF members, and preventing illegal fishing
- Monitoring and preventing illegal logging activities in the PIF member states
- Contributing to international peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN
- Maintaining peace and security within the region, including Intervention to restore peace and order in one of the Island nations, if authorized to do so by the Forum assembly itself.

The details of our suggestions for these upgrades in security mechanisms are set out in a companion submission to the inquiry *on "Australia's Defence relationships with Pacific Island nations".* They would play a very important role in countering any possible malign foreign influences in the region.

Arguments for the Proposal

The general argument is that we need to embrace our Forum partners more closely at the regional level, to build a closer sense of community and partnership between ourselves and the other Forum (or Community) members. This would provide a major bulwark against any malign influence from China or any other foreign state. Similar initiatives have been under discussion for many years in any case, aiming to lead towards a Pacific region "of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives."

In summary the arguments for the Community include

- It will provide improved collective security for the Pacific region, to counter any perceived security threat from China or other external powers;

- It will facilitate greater cooperation and effectiveness in commercial enterprises, including protection of the fishing industries of the Pacific island states, the tropical forests on land, and the ocean environment in general;
- It will facilitate greater cooperation in the distribution of aid and development funds to the island states, and satisfy objections from island states, particularly Fiji, that policy in this area is dictated by Australia and New Zealand;
- It will help in establishing basic human rights, such as gender equality, within the region;
- It will allow greater participation by the island states in the formulation of regional policy in general. This would lead to an improved sense of partnership, involvement, and general community feeling between the member states, which can only be a good thing.

Possible Objections

Some arguments against this proposal are easily anticipated:

a) Sovereignty

A standard objection to any such proposal involving international integration is that it would infringe on the sacred principle of national sovereignty. There is also a standard reply, which is that no one nation has sovereignty over common community issues or problems anyway. The theoretical answer to this challenge lies in the principle of *'subsidiarity'* or self-determination, formulated by the EU, which was recognized in the Maastricht Treaty.

According to this principle, decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the individual citizen, so that whatever can be done locally, regionally or nationally should not be done at community level. Only those functions which absolutely require collective action, and cannot be performed by the member states independently, will become community responsibilities. Thus the member states will retain their sovereignty over internal affairs and most of their external functions as well. This principle would need to be adopted by the new Community also.

In this connection, we cannot resist quoting from William Penn, who noted the problem of national sovereignty three hundred years ago in his *'Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe'* (Penn 1692), advocating for the first time a European Parliament. He examined the proposition: *"That Soveraign Princes and States will hereby become not Soveraign: a Thing they will never endure".* He answers that this is a Mistake: *"they remain as Soveraign at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the usual Revenue they pay them is diminished. So that the Soveraignties are as they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one another: And if this be called a*

lessening of their Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones, and that each Soveraignty is equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from committing them."

    b) Cost

Another likely objection to these proposals would be the cost to the Australian taxpayer. Certainly Australia and New Zealand would have to find the majority of any funds involved, as they are by far the largest developed economies in the region. The costs would not necessarily be large, however. Australia would mostly be transferring its unilateral control of existing funding into the hands of the new Community. As mentioned, new bureaucratic institutions would need to be set up to administer these funds, but this could largely be achieved by a separation of existing elements of the Departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs and 'rebranding' them as belonging to the Community, as we have mentioned above.

The establishment of a new Pacific Islands Regiment would certainly be costly, but we would argue that the cost would be very well worthwhile in terms of the great benefits to common security in our Pacific region which we have outlined above, and also they would be relatively small compared to the overall defence budget, which has been increased significantly in recent times. It would signal that Australia is seriously embracing its role as a genuine partner, albeit inevitably a senior partner, in its regional community.

Summary and Conclusions

Maintaining and deepening the regional integration between the members of the Pacific Islands Forum brings obvious benefits, and can do much to promote peace and prosperity in the region. The smaller island states simply cannot provide all the benefits of modern life for themselves, and must rely on help and co-operation from the larger states to provide higher education, technical skills, industrial goods, hospital facilities and employment for their people. Trade, investment and transport are best co-ordinated at the regional level, as also is the supervision and conservation of natural resources such as the fish stocks in the ocean and the tropical forests on land. Regional organizations can help maintain stable governance in fragile member states, as exemplified in the RAMSI mission, and can help counter any undue influence from outside, foreign states. Much has already been achieved in these areas, but much more remains to be done in the future.

Australia and New Zealand have generally adopted a sensible and bipartisan approach to the development of the Pacific region. The two governments between them provide the lion's share of the funding for regional organizations, and they are generally in favour of greater integration, as exemplified by the Australian joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

in 2003 [Senate Committee 2003], the Labor Party policy discussion paper *'Towards a Pacific Community'* [Sercombe 2005], or the recent statements of Scott Morrison and Alex Hawke [Hawke 2019]. But their attitude has been that it must be for the Pacific Islands themselves to determine the costs and benefits of the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, and they have taken something of a back seat in its implementation. Recent developments should impel them towards playing a more active role, perhaps, which ought to be well received by other Forum members.

Australia and New Zealand have also played an active role as 'deputy sheriff' for the region on several occasions, such as the military interventions in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. These actions were successful and well justified, being sanctioned by the United Nations and the Forum, respectively. There is always a danger, though, that such actions will be seen as paternalism and 'gunboat diplomacy', and arouse resentment among the smaller island states. Far better would be a collective response to such emergencies, carried out by regional security forces.

The obvious next stage in the integration process is the upgrading of the Pacific Islands Forum into a Pacific Islands Community. This would not actually require huge changes in the regional architecture, or involve huge additional expenditure. Most of the elements have already been suggested in the Pacific Plan.

The new institutions we have discussed include a Pacific Court, to adjudicate on cases involving regional treaties, and a Pacific Parliamentary Assembly, a successor to the present Forum Presiding Officers Conference, to provide political input and impetus to regional decision-making. These bodies would also provide prototypes for an eventual Pacific legal system and a possible Pacific Parliament. The formal institution of a Council of Ministers, with a qualified majority voting system on the European pattern, is also recommended.

We have also proposed strengthened regional security systems, including a Pacific Islands Maritime Patrol, to regulate a sustainable fishing industry in the region, and a Pacific Islands Regiment, to restore order in case of a breakdown in one of the island states, and also to carry out peacekeeping duties and provide some employment for the island people. The Community would also provide new mechanisms for arriving at collective decisions on defence and security issues for the Forum as a whole, which would do much to counter the fears of increasing Chinese influence in the region.

The Pacific Plan discussed many further initiatives to do with trade, economic and social development in the region, which we have not discussed here in any detail. In any case, the Forum's members are already firmly launched on a path towards greater integration. If wisely managed, this course will indeed lead to a

Pacific region "of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives."

Appendix. *Qualified majority voting schemes*

The European Union has pioneered the use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. If it is based purely on population, the ideal scheme is known as the Penrose scheme, after the mathematician Lionel Penrose, or alternatively as the 'Jagiellonian compromise' [Penrose 1946]. It gives each member country a vote proportional to the square root of its population. Without going into details, this provides the ideal balance between the larger countries, which should have the largest vote, and the smaller countries, which should have at least a non-negligible voice in the outcome.

The European Union has never formally adopted the Penrose scheme, but by a process of pragmatic compromise, it has arrived at a very similar allotment of votes, as shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1. *Number of votes W allotted to each member state in the European Council of Ministers as a function of population P (in millions), according to the Treaty of Nice. Germany is the largest state with 82 million, Malta the smallest with 410,000. The ideal Penrose formula is shown as a dashed line (W proportional to square root of P).*

If the Penrose scheme was adopted by the Pacific Islands Forum, starting from Niue with one vote, then the votes allotted to the other members of the Forum would be as listed in Table 1. It can be seen that Australia has the largest vote at 34% of the total, as appropriate to its large population, but not a dominant vote.

Even Australia and New Zealand voting together would make up just less than 50% of the vote, and could be outvoted by all the other island states voting as a bloc. Note that in this perhaps unlikely eventuality, the vote of tiny Niue would be enough to swing the balance either way.

This 'ideal' scheme still gives Australia and New Zealand a virtually dominant voice under most circumstances. In this case, with such a disparity in populations between the member states, it might be desirable to adopt an even flatter voting distribution. An alternative scheme is shown in Table 1, where votes are allotted in proportion to the cube root of the population (!), rather than the square root.

Country	Population	Votes (Penrose scheme)	Votes (Alternative scheme)
Australia	23,717,700	121	24
Cook Islands	14,974	3	2
Fiji	859,178	23	8
Kiribati	106,461	8	4
Marshall Islands	56,086	6	3
Micronesia	101,351	8	4
Nauru	10,084	3	2
New Zealand	4,556,270	53	14
Niue	1,613	1	1
Palau	20,901	4	2
Papua New Guinea	7,398,500	68	17
Solomon Islands	581,344	19	7
Tonga	103,252	8	4
Tuvalu	11,323	3	2
Vanuatu	264,652	13	5
Western Samoa	187,820	11	5
Totals	**37,991,509**	**352**	**104**

Table 1. *Examples of votes that might be allotted to each member state of the Pacific Islands Forum under the Penrose qualified majority voting scheme, and an alternative scheme mentioned in the text. Population figures according to Wikipedia, 2015.*

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